Refuse an amount decimal cannot hold instead of guessing at it - #151
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… at it Currency.ValueAsNumber answered an out-of-range amount three different ways: a positive one clamped to decimal.MaxValue, a negative one threw FormatException, and a very small one quietly became zero. XRPL issued currency runs from 1e-81 to roughly 1e96 - a 16-digit mantissa with an exponent in [-96, 80], per rippled's STAmount - while decimal stops near 7.9e28. No parsing changes that. The only thing available is how to fail. The clamp is gone. Above the range this now throws AmountOutOfRangeException, carrying the value as the node sent it. Answering 1e96 with 7.9e28 is wrong by 67 orders of magnitude, and it did not stay contained: GetBalanceChanges subtracts two balances, so the clamped value went on to throw OverflowException from the arithmetic instead - one silent lie turning into a second, unrelated exception a caller could not diagnose. The negative case was a plain bug. The fallback's NumberStyles expression came to AllowExponent | AllowDecimalPoint, missing AllowLeadingSign, so no negative value could reach the branch written to handle it. The primary parse was correct throughout, despite six & terms that all evaluate to zero. An amount below 1e-28 still returns zero, and that asymmetry is deliberate: a balance of 1e-81 rounded to zero is zero at any scale a caller can act on, so failing over it would cost more than it protects. Offer.AmountEach reads the same property on both sides of an order and divides them, on values anyone may place in the book. It used to return a plausible-looking exchange rate that was wrong by 67 orders of magnitude without throwing at all. It and GetBalanceChanges now document what they do on untrusted amounts rather than leaving it to be found. Console.WriteLine(exception) is out of the parse path. Six tests, including that a negative amount inside the range still parses - without it the same tests would pass on an implementation that refused every negative value, and negative balances are ordinary. Restoring the clamp fails three of them. Minor rather than patch: code that read an out-of-range amount used to get a number and now gets an exception, which is a contract change even though no signature moved. Representing the full range rather than refusing it is #150.
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Included review availability: 1 review is currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 2 reviews per hour. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughCurrency amount parsing now reports decimal overflow with ChangesCurrency range handling
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The change standardizes handling of amounts that cannot fit in decimal and adds targeted tests; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The changes satisfy issue Full details: Out of Scope Changes checkExplanation The changelog, related tests, documentation, and package version updates support the requested amount-handling change. No unrelated code changes are evident, and full-range exact amount representation remains out of scope. Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 76.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 25 functions across 6 files. (3 skipped: 3 unsupported.)
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In `@Xrpl/Models/Common/Currency.cs`:
- Around line 123-129: Update the fallback parsing in Currency.ValueAsNumber so
NaN, Infinity, and -Infinity are reported as FormatException rather than
AmountOutOfRangeException; only finite double values that decimal cannot
represent should remain out-of-range. Add regression tests covering these
floating-point symbols.
In `@Xrpl/Models/Transactions/BookOffers.cs`:
- Around line 102-109: Update the order-book ratio calculation to evaluate both
TakerPays.Value and TakerGets.Value before the zero-denominator early return, so
an out-of-range TakerGets still raises AmountOutOfRangeException. Add a
regression test covering TakerPays.Value equal to "0" and TakerGets.Value equal
to "9e80".
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CHANGES.mdTests/Xrpl.Tests/Models/TestCurrency.csXrpl/Client/Exceptions/AmountOutOfRangeException.csXrpl/Models/Common/Currency.csXrpl/Models/Transactions/BookOffers.csXrpl/Utils/GetBalanceChanges.csXrpl/Xrpl.csproj
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Review findings, both accepted. double.TryParse accepts "NaN", "Infinity" and "-Infinity" whatever NumberStyles it is handed - those symbols are matched separately from the numeric ones. Since the test that separates "will not fit" from "is not a number" runs through double, all three came back as AmountOutOfRangeException: a confident statement about magnitude for a string that has none. Checked against the runtime rather than taken on the reviewer's word, then guarded with double.IsFinite. Offer.AmountEach read its two sides lazily, so the early return for a zero TakerPays skipped TakerGets entirely - an unrepresentable numerator went unnoticed whenever the denominator happened to be zero. The exception this branch documents was therefore not one a caller could rely on: whether it appeared depended on the value of an unrelated field. Both sides are read first. It also parsed TakerPays twice, and ValueAsNumber parses on every read. The second is the one worth noting. The documentation added in the previous commit claimed something the code did not do, in a change whose whole subject is not saying false things about values. Four tests. Removing IsFinite fails one, restoring the lazy read fails another.
… on it Review findings. ToString interpolates ValueAsNumber, so making the getter throw made ToString throw with it - for positives, which used to print a clamped number, as well as for negatives, which already threw. By convention ToString does not throw, and the places it is reached from are logging, string interpolation and a debugger's watch window: exactly where someone would be while working out why an amount is unusual. Failing there hides the value at the moment it is most wanted. It now falls back to the raw string, which is what the node sent. Two tests were missing behind claims already made. GetBalanceChanges documents that it throws on an out-of-range amount, and nothing exercised that through GetBalanceChanges - only a hand-written subtraction imitating what it does. Imitating the arithmetic proves the arithmetic; it does not prove the method reaches it, which is what the documentation promises. Now driven through the method, on a negative balance in a RippleState node - the ordinary shape from the low account's side, and the case that used to fail as FormatException. And one edge is documented rather than fixed: writing decimal.MaxValue through the setter formats with G16, which rounds the mantissa up past what decimal holds, so the SDK can write a string the ledger would accept and then refuse to read it. The window is the last ~7e12 below decimal.MaxValue, reachable only by assigning a number no token amount would be, and changing how the setter rounds would touch every round trip in the type to rescue a value nobody writes. The test states the decision so the next person meets one rather than a surprise. Restoring the clamp now fails seven tests.
Checked against rippled first, which changed what this should be. I had proposed replacing G16 with truncation, on the belief that rippled truncates a mantissa when normalising. It does not: Number.cpp sets RoundingMode::ToNearest as the default, which is what G16 already does. Making the SDK truncate would have moved it away from the protocol, not toward it. The rounding stays. What is left is narrow. At the top of decimal's own range, rounding to nearest rounds up past what the type holds, so the setter wrote a string it then refused to read - a valid ledger amount the SDK produced and could not consume. There, and only there, the sixteenth digit is truncated instead; truncating cannot overflow, because dropping digits only moves a number toward zero. Dust is pinned by a test. Balances like 0.000000000000000001 arrive from the network and must go back out, and they are safe because the ledger's limit is sixteen significant digits while dust carries one. The test exists because the obvious way to bound precision - truncating to sixteen decimal places rather than significant digits - turns 1e-18 into zero, and a remainder would vanish in silence. That mutation fails it. ValueAsNumber_16Digits_NeverRoundsUp asserted that a round trip must not increase a value. The protocol makes no such promise, and the test could not have caught a violation anyway: its input has exactly sixteen significant digits, so there was nothing to round. Replaced by the property that does hold, and by one stating the rounding outright so the next reader does not repeat the mistake I nearly shipped. Also written down: why the setter rounds while the codec refuses more than sixteen digits. They see different inputs. Seventeen digits cannot arrive from the network - rippled normalises the mantissa into [1e15, 1e16) before serialising - so the codec only ever meets a hand-written string, while the setter meets computed decimals that routinely carry 28. AmmMath returns them.
…ed it Release preparation for 27/08, found by checking what actually changed since 11.0.0.0 rather than by looking at this branch alone. Xrpl.BinaryCodec/XrplBinaryCodec.cs changed in #147 and the package version did not. Promoting that way publishes nothing: dotnet nuget push runs with --skip-duplicate, so a package whose version already exists on the feed is passed over in silence, and the fix reaches no consumer while the run stays green. Moved to 11.0.1.0 - a performance fix with no contract change, so patch. The same PR left no CHANGES.md entry. A 1.73x change on the path every signing operation takes is not a silent one, so it has one now, with the measurement and with why the usual telling of that bug oversells it. Xrpl stays at 11.1.0.0: this release carries a contract change, since code that read an out-of-range amount used to get a number and now gets an exception. AddressCodec, Keypairs and both X402 packages are untouched and keep their versions - they are consumed by ProjectReference, so a package built at a newer version keeps depending on the published ones. CHANGES.md still opens with "## Unreleased". Stamping it belongs to the promotion, when the date is known.
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Closes #148.
Currency.ValueAsNumberanswered an out-of-range amount three different ways: a positive one clamped todecimal.MaxValue, a negative one threwFormatException, and a very small one quietly became zero.XRPL issued currency runs from
1e-81to roughly1e96— a 16-digit mantissa with an exponent in[-96, 80], per rippled'sSTAmount— whiledecimalstops near7.9e28. No amount of parsing changes that. The only thing actually available is how to fail, and this PR picks one answer instead of three.What changes
1e29,9e8079228162514264337593543950335AmountOutOfRangeException-1e29,-9e80FormatExceptionAmountOutOfRangeException1e-9600(unchanged)abcFormatExceptionFormatException(unchanged)-100,1.5e-10The exception carries the value as the node sent it, so the real figure is still reachable — refusing to answer should not also destroy the evidence.
Why the clamp had to go rather than just the parse bug
Answering
1e96with7.9e28is wrong by 67 orders of magnitude, and it did not stay contained.GetBalanceChangessubtracts two balances, so the clamped value went on to throwOverflowExceptionfrom the arithmetic — one silent lie turning into a second, unrelated exception that a caller had no way to trace back.Fixing only
AllowLeadingSignwould have removed theFormatExceptionand left that path exactly as it was.The parse bug itself
The fallback's
NumberStylesexpression evaluated toAllowExponent | AllowDecimalPoint—AllowLeadingSignmissing — so no negative value could reach the branch written to handle it.Worth recording: the primary parse was correct all along. Its six
&terms all evaluate to zero and the three standalone flags leave164=AllowLeadingSign | AllowDecimalPoint | AllowExponent. Only the fallback was wrong. Both are now one named constant.Underflow stays zero, deliberately
The ledger reaches down to
1e-81anddecimalstops near1e-28, so small amounts still round to zero rather than throwing. A balance that size is zero at any scale a caller can act on, and failing over it would cost more than it protects. An amount of1e96reported as7.9e28is not in that category. The asymmetry is written down where the code makes it, not left to be inferred.Offer.AmountEach, which #148 did not coverBookOffers.cs:101reads the same property on both sides of an order and divides them, on values anyone may place in the book. Before this it could return a plausible-looking exchange rate wrong by 67 orders of magnitude, without throwing — on a property whose only purpose is being compared against other offers. It now fails the same single way, and both it andGetBalanceChangesdocument what they do on untrusted amounts instead of leaving it to be discovered in production.Also:
Console.WriteLine(exception)is out of the parse path. A library does not write to the console.Tests
Six new, in
TestUCurrency. One of them exists specifically to keep the others honest: a negative amount inside the range must still parse. Without it the overflow tests would pass on an implementation that simply refused every negative value — and negative balances are ordinary, since aRippleStatebalance is negative from the low account's side.Restoring the clamp fails three of the six. Full suite: 1362 green.
TestCurrency.cspreviously had 12 tests onValueAsNumber, every one a round trip insidedecimalrange — no case above it, below it, or negative-and-out-of-range. That is why none of this was visible.Version
11.0.0.0→11.1.0.0. Minor rather than patch: code that read an out-of-range amount used to get a number and now gets an exception, which is a contract change even though no signature moved.Xrpl.BinaryCodec,Xrpl.AddressCodecandXrpl.Keypairsare untouched and keep their versions.Not in scope
Representing the full range instead of refusing it — an exact amount type over
BigIntegermantissa and exponent, the model rippled andxrpl.jsboth use — is #150. This PR makes the interim behaviour honest while that is decided.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
AmountOutOfRangeException.Documentation
Release